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Abstract Doxing is the intentional public release onto the
Internet of personal information about an individual by a
third party, often with the intent to humiliate, threaten,
intimidate, or punish the identified individual. In this paper
I present a conceptual analysis of the practice of doxing
and how it differs from other forms of privacy violation. I
distinguish between three types of doxing: deanonymizing
doxing, where personal information establishing the iden-
tity of a formerly anonymous individual is released; tar-
geting doxing, that discloses personal information that
reveals specific details of an individual’s circumstances
that are usually private, obscure, or obfuscated; and dele-
gitimizing doxing, which reveals intimate personal infor-
mation that damages the credibility of that individual. I
also describe how doxing differs from blackmail and
defamation. I argue that doxing may be justified in cases
where it reveals wrongdoing (such as deception), but only
if the information released is necessary to reveal that such
wrongdoing has occurred and if it is in the public interest to
reveal such wrongdoing. Revealing additional information,
such as that which allows an individual to be targeted for
harassment and intimidation, is unjustified. I illustrate my
discussion with the examples of the alleged identification
of the creator of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, by Newsweek
magazine, the identification of the notorious Reddit user
Violentacrez by the blog Gawker, and the harassment of
game developer Zoe Quinn in the ‘GamerGate’ Internet
campaign.
Keywords Doxing  Internet harassment  Anonymity 
Journalism  Hate speech  Privacy
A spectre is haunting the Internet—the spectre of doxing.1
Doxing, sometimes spelt ‘doxxing’ or ‘d0xing’, involves
releasing someone’s personal details onto the Internet in an
easily accessible form. These details may include full legal
names, residential addresses, unique identifiers for gov-
ernmental records and services (such as social security
numbers in the US), business records and documents, and
personal photographs of one’s self and loved ones. These
details may already be publicly available, but in difficult to
access forms or distributed across various sources that
obscure them from casual discovery. These details might
also be government, company, or organization records
obtained via a security breach. In some cases, they might
even have been obtained directly from the person herself,
either willingly or unknowingly. Doxing can occur to
anyone, from high-profile public figures to obscure every-
day people. All that is necessary to become a victim of
doxing, it seems, is to be of interest to someone else on the
Internet.
There are various motives for doxing someone. It may be
motivated by a desire to expose wrongdoing and to hold the
wrongdoer to account. It may be used to humiliate, intimi-
date, threaten, or punish the identified individual. It is often a
tool for ‘cyber stalking’, as the information may be released
in a context that would cause a reasonable person to fear for
her life (Citron 2014). It can also serve as a tool for Internet
vigilantism, where those opposed to someone’s actions
retaliate by revealing her identity and personal information,
leaving the victim open to public ridicule, harassment, and
vilification (Solove 2007). And information released onto
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the Internet is easy to access and difficult to remove: entering
a doxing victim’s name into a search engine may reveal her
personal details and the abuse associated with the doxing
attack for years. The potential for harm and disruption are
obvious when a person’s professional life and reputation
depends on her visibility on the Internet (Citron 2014).
As the above suggests, doxing may have a devastating
impact for its victims. It assists in harassing and stalking
individuals, both physically and on the Internet (Citron
2014). Such stalking creates significant distress and
increases the risk of physical harm, especially if the per-
sonal information is used to encourage others to abuse the
victim. A parallel can be drawn with sexual harassment on
the Internet. Mary Anne Franks (2012) lists three factors
that contribute to the harm online sexual harassment cau-
ses: the harassers’ anonymity, the amplification of the
harassment caused by the accessibility of the harassing
content which may encourage further harassment, and the
permanence that results from the difficulty of removing
harassing content from the Internet. Even if doxing is not
used as a tool for sexual harassment, these factors also
contribute to the harms of having personal information
revealed on the Internet.
Despite these harms, doxing is sometimes presented as a
tool of protest and for exposing wrongdoing. Corruption by
Chinese government officials is often the target of the so-
called ‘Human Flesh Search Engine’, composed of Chinese
Internet users who search for and release evidence of pri-
vate and public transgressions and wrongdoing (Gao and
Stanyer 2014). For example, an investigation into two
Chinese local government officials was launched after
documents listing travel expenses for research trips to the
US and Canada were anonymously released onto the
Internet. These documents provided evidence that public
funding had been used to pay for trips to tourist attractions
(Gao and Stanyer 2014).
This paper is an attempt to untangle the intertwined
concepts and issues raised by doxing. I present and justify
the claim that significant differences exist between various
cases of doxing that justify placing them into different
categories. I call these categories deanonymization, tar-
geting, and delegitimization. Deanonymizing doxing
releases personal information establishing the identity of a
formerly anonymous or pseudonymous individual. Tar-
geting doxing discloses personal information that reveals
specific details of an individual’s circumstances that are
usually private, obscure, or obfuscated. Finally, delegit-
imizing doxing reveals intimate personal information that
damages the credibility of that individual. I use this clas-
sification to highlight the significant differences between
three cases of doxing: the alleged identification of Bitcoin
creator Satoshi Nakamoto, the identification of the notori-
ous Reddit Internet forum user Violentacrez, and the
harassment of several female game developers in the
‘GamerGate’ incident. I conclude that in cases where
exposing wrongdoing is in the public interest,
deanonymizing and delegitimizing doxing is permissible
only to the extent necessary to reveal that wrongdoing has
occurred. Using any form of doxing to humiliate or
threaten the subject, and revealing more information than
necessary to establish wrongdoing, is unjustified.
Defining doxing
The term ‘doxing’ comes from the phrase ‘dropping doc-
uments’ or ‘dropping dox’ on someone, which was a form
of revenge in 1990s outlaw hacker culture that involved
uncovering and revealing the identity of people who fos-
tered anonymity (Honan 2014). The term is already
prominent enough to be included in formal dictionaries.
For instance, the Oxford British and World English Dic-
tionary defines doxing as to ‘‘[s]earch for and publish
private or identifying information about (a particular
individual) on the Internet, typically with malicious intent’’
(Oxford Dictionaries 2015). As the Oxford definition sug-
gests, doxing does not necessarily have to be motivated by
malice. Several high-profile incidents of so-called ‘doxing’
involved journalists revealing the identities of formerly
pseudonymous Internet identities (Chen 2012a; Goodman
2014). Despite this, doxing is a term with negative con-
notations: labeling these accounts as ‘doxing’ suggests that
the journalists involved have acted wrongly in revealing
personal information about a pseudonymous individual
(Beaujon 2014). Examining the concept in more detail by
considering the different kinds of personal information that
may be released will help to determine whether doxing is
necessarily or primarily a malicious act.
A more nuanced account of doxing can begin by con-
sidering what it actually establishes: it removes some
degree of anonymity from a specific person. Marx’s (1999)
concept of identity knowledge offers a useful tool for this
task. The seven broad types of identity knowledge Marx
describes are listed in Table 1. Perfect anonymity,
according to Marx (1999), is the inability to be identified
according to any of these seven types of identity
knowledge.
Being identified by some of these types will be greater
threats to anonymity than others. For example, being
identified as an adult male in a large European city does
little to reduce my anonymity, as it does not easily allow
someone to gain other types of identity knowledge about
me. However, being identified by name and address makes
maintaining my anonymity more difficult as this informa-
tion can be easily used to establish other types of identity
knowledge. Knowing my name allows someone to search
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public records and databases (to say nothing of the Inter-
net) for further information about me. Knowing my address
allows others to encounter me in person and observe my
movements, habits, physical appearance and characteris-
tics. In Marx’s classification, these observations establish
pattern knowledge and social categorization identity
information about me.
UsingMarx’s categorization, I suggest that doxing should
be understood as releasing publically a type of identity
knowledge about an individual (the subject of doxing) that
establishes a verifiable connection between it and another
type (or types) of identity knowledge about that person. The
verifiability of doxing distinguishes it from other forms of
exposure and publicity. As the origins of the term ‘doxing’
(‘dropping documents’ or ‘dropping dox’) suggest, it utilizes
documentary evidence of identity knowledge.
Different types of identity knowledge are documented in
different forms. Identity knowledge relating to personal
details used for administrative purposes may be recorded in
official records or documents, such as birth certificates, tax
returns, employment records, and so on. Such documents
may reveal legal name, locatability, and pseudonyms that
are connected to an individual’s name or location. Docu-
ments that describe unique characteristics possessed by an
individual in a pseudonymous record that is unrelated to
her name or location may reveal further identity knowledge
if it can be cross-referenced with other information. This
possibility exists where medical records are not sufficiently
anonymized. Symbols of eligibility may document them-
selves (such as railway tickets) or may be documented
through records of such symbols being granted to an
individual, such as graduating from a university. Similarly,
official documentation will exist for symbols of eligibility
being withheld or taken from an individual.
Other types of identity knowledge, such as pattern
knowledge and social characterization, are documented in
other ways. Frequently updated location information, such
as stored by mobile devices that record their location, may
reveal an individual’s daily routine, and so establish pattern
knowledge about that individual.2 Social characterization
may be established through photographs and imagery
recorded about a person and her behaviour. Such charac-
terization will often be up to the interpretation of the
observer, and may be misleading if the images are taken
out of context or presented in a biased manner. This is
especially the case with activities that are invested with
social or symbolic significance, or which challenge






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 The possibility of revealing pattern knowledge is why mobile
device metadata (information about its usage) is so sensitive. For an
example of how metadata analysis can reveal pattern knowledge
about an individual, see Ockenden and Leslie (2015).
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of a woman wearing revealing clothing or expressing her
sexuality may be used to mock or humiliate her for not
conforming to traditional notions of female behavior and
gender roles (Poole 2013).
Doxing should be distinguished from related concepts
such as blackmail, defamation, and gossip. Unlike black-
mail, doxing does not involve making a demand to the
subject to prevent information being released. A black-
mailer only releases information if the victim does not
comply with the blackmailer’s demands. While the threat
of doxing can serve as blackmail, doxing itself is not
blackmail.
Defamation also involves the public release of infor-
mation with the intention to humiliate, threaten, intimidate,
or punish the subject. However, for information to be
defamatory it must reveal something damaging to the
reputation of the person (or people) described. Doxing does
not necessarily have to reveal something questionable or
embarrassing about the person involved. As I will describe
later, while one form of doxing aims to harm the subject’s
reputation, doxing itself does not necessarily involve
releasing such information.
Finally, doxing differs from gossip (even malicious
gossip) in that it relies on releasing actual (or believed to be
actual) identity knowledge rather than suggestion, hearsay
and innuendo. Bok (1989:93) defines gossip as ‘‘informal
personal communication about other people who are absent
or treated as absent’’ (numbering of features omitted).
While doxing can be formal or informal (i.e. consist of
official documents or records, or accurate informal
accounts), it is the difference between communicating
information about someone and communicating informa-
tion of someone. To illustrate this with a benign example,
consider the difference between claiming ‘X wore a pink
tutu at a funeral’ and releasing a photo of X wearing a pink
tutu at a funeral. The first is an instance of gossip, while the
second is a form of doxing.3 The photograph serves as
documentation of the claim being made about X, and is
evidence that can be verified. Under Marx’s classification
of identity knowledge, it is social characterization knowl-
edge as it documents X’s apparent disregard for social
norms. Merely telling a friend about X’s poor taste in
funeral attire does not provide this documentary evidence.
The value of anonymity and obscurity
Before examining the different forms of doxing in detail, I
will establish the value of what doxing endangers: the
subject’s obscurity and anonymity. Doxing undermines
what Ruth Gavison calls ‘‘our concern over our accessi-
bility to others: the extent to which we are known to others,
the extent to which others have physical access to us, and
the extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention’’
(1980:423). The subject no longer controls some aspect of
identity knowledge about her, which reduces her ability to
decide what she reveals about herself and to whom she
reveals it. This control is an important aspect of a person’s
identity. We reveal some aspects of ourselves to some
people but not to others. Our relationships with others are
shaped by what we choose reveal to them and what they
decide to reveal to us. Our identities and the social value
attached to them (i.e. reputation and public persona) are
difficult to build and easy to lose. Even forfeiting some
degree of such control is a way of establishing one’s own
identity. Choosing to publicly document one’s experiences
and movements are decisions individuals make about how
they wish to present themselves to others. Influencing how
others perceive you is a vital part of establishing who you
are (and crucially, who you are not) as a person.
To further illustrate the value of anonymity, I again turn
to the work of Marx (1999), this time for his list of the
rationales for anonymity. These are listed in Table 2. There
is much to say about the significance of each of these
rationales and whether they should be accepted in all cases.
For reasons of space and scope, however, I will only make
a few general comments here.
As Marx’s list suggests, anonymity and obscurity are
both forms of protection.4 It can disguise attributes that
may prejudice how others receive someone’s work and
ideas, such as gender, race, ethnicity, or class. It is anon-
ymity’s protective value that makes doxing particularly
harmful in Internet communication, as it removes the
subject’s anonymity without an equivalent loss of anon-
ymity for the attacker.
Collecting different types of identity knowledge about
an individual can be regarded as building a ‘dossier’ on that
person.5 Dossier building involves the ‘‘compilation,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal informa-
tion on individuals’’ (Reichel 1977: 265). The opportunities
created by the Internet for gathering personal information
have effectively democratized dossier building. Now
almost anyone with the desire and the time to search for
another’s personal information has the tools and informa-
tion sources available for her to do so.
3 Specifically, this is a form of what I call delegitimizing doxing, as I
will describe later.
4 This protection can of course be abused, as ‘poison pen’ letters and
anonymous inflammatory comments on the Internet demonstrate.
5 I thank Michael Nagelborg for this point.
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Types of doxing
I propose categorizing doxing into three types:
deanonymization, targeting, and delegitimization. Each
attempts to remove or damage something different from the
subject: anonymity, obscurity, and credibility, respectively.
Each type of doxing also creates new possibilities to further
interfere with the life of the person involved.
Deanonymization makes it easier to obtain other types of
identity knowledge about the subject, and so creates greater
opportunities for the other types of doxing to occur.
Whatever advantages or protection the subject sought to
gain by seeking anonymity or adopting a pseudonym will
be lost. Targeting doxing creates the possibility that future
harassment may take a physical form, with the uncertainty
and risks of harm that it brings. The subject may be har-
assed and inconvenienced by others using her personal
information to impersonate her. Finally, delegitimization
presents a motivation for carrying out harassment and
potentially further doxing by detailing how the subject is
somehow unworthy of respect. These categories are listed
and summarized in Table 3.
I now describe each category of doxing in further detail.
Deanonymizing doxing
Deanonymizing doxing releases information that reveals
the identity of the person (or persons) who has previously
been anonymous or known by a pseudonym. It also covers
instances where someone’s identity is revealed publically
regardless of whether she has deliberately sought to con-
ceal her identity or not.
Deanonymization is the broadest of the three categories
of doxing as it can affect every type of identity knowledge
and negates every rationale for anonymity. Depending on
the subject’s rationale for anonymity and the type of
Table 2 Rationales for anonymity [based on Marx (1999)]
Rationale for anonymity Explanation
1. Facilitating the flow of information Encourages information to be disclosed where there may be risks and penalties associated
with doing so (such as whistleblowing)
2. Obtaining personal information for research Allows individuals to be honest in their responses without fear of being punished or
stigmatized if the information became public
3. Encouraging attention to the message content
instead of the messenger
The identity of the informer may prejudice the reception of the information
4. Encouraging reporting, seeking information,
and self-help
Individuals can report activities or to seek out information without fear of being stigmatized
or victimized if others knew they were seeking certain information or were reporting
certain activities
5. Obtaining resources or encouraging actions
that involve illegality
Encourages individuals to seek help for problems that are linked with illegal actions (such as
illicit drug addiction) or hand in illegal items (such as amnesties for contraband goods)
6. Protecting donors or those taking controversial
but socially useful actions
Encourages individuals to contribute goods or actions without fear of intimidation,
harassment, or creating future obligations
7. Protecting strategic economic interests Allows someone to interact in the marketplace without their identity affecting their
transactions (such as being charged more if someone is known to be wealthy)
8. Protecting one’s time, space, and person Allows someone to maintain their isolation from unwanted attention or interruption by
others
9. Aiding judgments based on specified criteria Promotes the unbiased assessment of something without being influenced by the identity of
those involved
10. Protecting reputation and assets Prevents an individual’s personal information being used by someone else to deceive and
defraud others
11. Avoiding persecution Allows individuals to avoid harms that may result from belonging to a particular group (such
as belonging to a persecuted minority)
12. Enhancing rituals, games, play, and
celebrations
Allows individuals to interact in particular contexts without affecting their status and
relationships in other contexts
13. Encouraging experimentation and risk-taking Allows individuals to experiment with different behaviours and actions so that they may
explore different ways of living without affecting their current relationships, commitments,
and reputation
14. Protecting personhood and autonomy in
sharing information
Allows individuals to control who has access to information about themselves and what
information they choose to share and when
15. Traditional expectations of anonymity Individuals expect that certain interactions do not involve revealing personal information
about themselves to others, such as paying for items with cash
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identity knowledge released, it may not cause significant
harm to the subject, and there may be plausible public
interest justifications for disclosing it. For example, there is
at least a prima facie public interest justification for
revealing someone’s identity when anonymity or a pseu-
donym is being used to deceive others for personal gain (a
con artist impersonating someone else to gain money or
prestige, for example). Literary hoaxes are an example that
I will return to later in discussing the potential justifications
for doxing.
A famous instance of deanonymizing doxing is the
reveal of the supposed identity of the person behind the
pseudonym ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’. Satoshi Nakamoto is the
name adopted by the creator (or creators) of the Bitcoin
crypto-currency (Nakamoto n.d.). The true identity of
Bitcoin’s creator is still uncertain. An article in Newsweek
identified Dorian Satoshi Nakamoto as Bitcoin’s creator, a
claim he has repeatedly and consistently denied (Goodman
2014). The creator of Bitcoin has a number of clear
rationales for anonymity: avoiding interference, protection,
and a desire not to draw attention away from the creation
itself.
Another example is the deanonymization of the notori-
ous Reddit moderator ‘Violentacrez’, who was revealed to
be Michael Brutsch by the blog Gawker.6 Brutsch was a
volunteer moderator who contributed to and oversaw var-
ious forums (or ‘sub-reddits’) on the Reddit website. Vio-
lentacrez was heavily involved in deliberately provocative
sub-reddits such as ‘creepshots’ (which featured
voyeuristic photographs of unsuspecting women) and
‘jailbait’ (which featured photographs of girls under the
age of consent) (Chen 2012a). Brutsch claimed in a tele-
vision interview that he treated his activities on Reddit as a
game (Chen 2012c). This is the rationale of play from
Marx’s list of rationales for anonymity. Violentacrez was
an example of an Internet ‘troll’: someone who deliberately
flouts social norms and provokes others for her own
amusement, often under some form of anonymity (Phillips
2012).7 The pseudonym allowed Brutsch to entertain
himself and others by deliberately offending people and
breaking social taboos with the material he posted on the
website. Protecting his reputation (and employability) is
another important justification (and another of Marx’s
rationales for anonymity), and an accurate one given that
Brutsch lost his job as a result of his legal identity being
connected with that of Violentacrez (Chen 2012b).
Targeting doxing
Targeting doxing reveals specific information about an
individual that allows her to be physically located. It
reveals physical locatability (rather than communicative
locatability, like a telephone number or email address)
identity knowledge about the subject.8 Targeting doxing
increases the subject’s physical accessibility by removing
the obscurity surrounding where a person lives or works.
Losing this obscurity makes someone more vulnerable to
physical harassment because of whom specifically she is.
Targeting doxing often follows from deanonymization.
As Marx’s rationales for anonymity suggest, seeking
anonymity is frequently adopted to reduce the risk of being
targeted. The identity knowledge revealed through
deanonymizing doxing makes it easier to uncover further
identity knowledge, such as the subject’s physical location
and workplace.
The forms of harassment made possible by targeting
doxing range from irritating pranks to physical assault (or
worse). Relatively harmless but annoying pranks can range
from calls from car dealers responding to supposed interest
in a car to having to cancel unwanted deliveries ordered in
the subject’s name (Matisse 2015). Even these seemingly
Table 3 Types of Doxing
Type of doxing Description Loss to the
subject
Examples
Deanonymization Reveals any kind of identity knowledge about a person Anonymity Revealing the legal identity of someone
using a pseudonym
Targeting Reveals information that allows an individual to be physically
located
Obscurity Revealing someone’s home address
Delegitimization Reveals information intended to damage an individual’s
credibility, reputation, or character
Credibility Evidence of supposed immoral activity,
hypocrisy, or willful deception
6 The Violentacrez example may also be interpreted as an instance of
delegitimization, given his reputation for deliberately and publicly
breaking social norms.
7 Trolling is a complex phenomenon with nuances and its own
cultural norms that I cannot explore here. Whitney Phillips (2015)
presents a detailed account that places trolling into a broader cultural
context.
8 Revealing someone’s telephone number is deanonymizing doxing,
since it reveals a connection between a pseudonym (the phone
number) and the subject’s legal identity.
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minor annoyances can serve as a form of intimidation.
Mantilla (2015) mentions a case where a subject received
an unordered pizza that had been ordered under the name
of an accused murderer known to that individual. Another
possible form of harassment is ‘swatting’, where an
attacker makes a hoax call to the police claiming that there
is a violent disturbance at the subject’s address, prompting
an armed police response (Mantilla 2015).9 The identity
knowledge gained through targeting doxing can be used to
impersonate the subject, and in extreme cases, has been
used to make it appear that the subject herself is encour-
aging others to attack or sexually assault her (Jouvenal
2013; Citron 2014).
‘The Nuremberg Files’ website is a notorious example
of targeting doxing. This web site began in 1997 and listed
the names and personal details of doctors who performed
abortions in the US. The site also listed the personal details
of the doctors’ families (Solove 2007). The Nuremberg
Files example illustrates the importance of the context
within which identity knowledge is presented.10 At least
some of the information presented there (particularly, the
addresses of abortion clinics) would already be publicly
accessible. What makes it targeting doxing (beyond the
additional identity knowledge about the doctors and their
families) is presenting this information in a manner that
promotes harassing the subjects.
Delegitimizing doxing
Delegitimizing doxing releases private information with
the intention of undermining the subject’s credibility,
reputation, and/or character. It attempts to shame and
humiliate the subject, often by portraying her as a trans-
gressor of an established (or supposed)11 social norm.
Whether the subject herself accepts or promotes the social
norm is irrelevant. Revealing the subject to be a hypocrite
(by publicly supporting a social norm while privately
breaking it) is certainly an attempt at delegitimizing her,
but delegitimization goes beyond revealing actual or sup-
posed hypocrisy. It can serve as a tool for maintaining the
‘tyranny of the majority’ that concerned John Stuart Mill.
By drawing attention to how the subject differs from
‘‘prevailing opinion and feeling’’, delegitimizing doxing
serves to ‘‘fetter the development, and […] prevent the
formation of, any individuality not in harmony with its
ways’’ (Mill 1989[1859]: 8).
Reporting information and seeking advice, information,
or assistance (rationale 4 in Marx’s list) presents the pos-
sibility for delegitimization depending on the information
sought or reported, and the help requested. The traditional
confidentiality of medical records and library borrowings is
also motivated by a desire to keep potentially embarrassing
or easily misunderstood information secret, so that people
can seek medical help or read controversial books without
fear of being ostracized for doing so (Rindfleisch 1997;
Bowers 2006). A straightforward example is a teenage girl
anonymously seeking a pregnancy test or an abortion. If
her identity was revealed, she risks being stigmatized and
shamed for being sexually active at a young age, especially
if unmarried motherhood and/or abortion are unaccept-
able in her society.
Sexuality is frequently used to delegitimize others. The
violent and misogynist language surrounding many
instances of delegitimizing doxing implies the objectifica-
tion of the subject, portraying her as a thing to be used and
discarded rather than an autonomous person worthy of
respect (Nussbaum 2010). An example is involuntary
pornography or so-called ‘revenge porn’, where intimate or
explicit photographs and videos of individuals are posted
online without their consent, either by former lovers or by
third parties who have somehow acquired them (Mantilla
2015). These images are sometimes accompanied by per-
sonal information identifying the person (Citron 2014). As
Citron writes, ‘‘Harassers post women’s nude images
because they know it will make them unemployable,
undateable, and at risk for sexual assault’’ (2014:17). While
men are also victims of involuntary pornography, the
overwhelming majority of victims are women. For exam-
ple, Reynolds (2016) reports that images of women were
involved in 80 % of the 139 cases of involuntary pornog-
raphy reported in the UK between January and April 2015.
Involuntary pornography and other forms of delegitimizing
doxing of women based on their sexuality are only the
latest instances of the long-lived and surprisingly resilient
activity of ‘slut-shaming’, where women and girls are
ridiculed and harassed for their real or imagined sexual
activity. Such harassment has a history going back to at
least Roman times (Webb 2015). It also reveals a double
standard in the social norms associated with sexuality, as
male heterosexual activity does not share the same social
disapproval (Poole 2013; Citron 2014).
Part of the harm delegitimizing doxing causes is what
Franks (2012) calls ‘virtual captivity’: the abuse directed at
someone on the Internet is potentially available to everyone
who interacts with her, and so might affect every social
9 The term ‘swatting’ is derived from the name of police SWAT
(Special Weapons And Training) squads who respond to potentially
violent situations involving armed suspects.
10 Bowman-Grieve (2009) discusses the Nuremberg Files example in
more detail and places it into the broader context of violent anti-
abortion activism in the US.
11 A supposed social norm is one held by a minority in society that
they believed should hold sway over the majority. The lack of
widespread recognition means it is not an established norm (even if it
had been historically), but for the group who hold it, they believe that
everyone in society should accept it and judge others accordingly.
Doxing: a conceptual analysis 205
123
relation she has. The possibility that everyone the subject
interacts with (personally or professionally) has been
exposed to the delegitimizing material is enough to cause
significant emotional distress and social withdrawal. Mar-
tha Nussbaum describes something similar with her con-
cept of subjectivity-violation, where for an abuser,
‘‘pleasure is taken in invading and colonizing the person’s
inner world’’ (2010: 72).
The context or framing within which delegitimizing
doxing occurs is significant, and much of the harm it can
cause is a result of taking documentary evidence out of
context. An incident described by Boyd (2011) presents a
good illustration of this problem. A college admissions
officer asked boyd about an apparent contradiction in a
prospective student’s application: the student claimed to
want to leave the ‘gang-ridden’ community he lived in, but
the admissions officer found the student’s MySpace page
included gang insignia. The officer questioned why the
student would lie in his application; Boyd’s (2011)
response is that adopting gang insignia is a necessity for
survival in such a community, and that there is no con-
tradiction in adopting the social norms of a community and
secretly desiring to be free of their influence.
Delegitimizing doxing is often accompanied by target-
ing doxing, and so it might be questioned whether there is a
significant difference between them. The difference
between is that delegitimizing doxing supplies ‘evidence’
for targeting the person involved. If targeting doxing sup-
plies the means for harassing the subject, delegitimizing
doxing supplies the supposed ‘motive’ for doing so.
The combination of targeting and delegitimizing doxing
is demonstrated by the ‘GamerGate’ incident, where sev-
eral high-profile female computer game developers were
subjected to prolonged harassment, intimidation, and vili-
fication. The catalyst of this incident was an account posted
on the Internet by Eron Gjoni, a former boyfriend of the
independent game developer Zoe Quinn, of their failed
relationship (Mantilla 2015). Quinn’s personal details were
released on the Internet and she became the target of pro-
longed and sustained harassment, intimidation, and vilifi-
cation (Mantilla 2015). While attempts were made to
justify these attacks as attempts to expose wrongdoing in
computer games journalism, as one of the men Quinn was
alleged to have had a relationship with was a video games
journalist (who had not even written about Quinn’s game),
misogynism is a more convincing explanation (Mantilla
2015). Following the attacks on Quinn, other prominent
women associated with computer games, including devel-
oper Brianna Wu and critic Anita Sarkessian, were also
targets of sustained harassment and intimidation that
included targeting and delegitimizing doxing (Mantilla
2015).
Can doxing be justified?
I now discuss whether any instances of doxing are justifi-
able. I will argue that deanonymizing doxing may be
acceptable depending on the rationale for anonymity and if
there is a compelling public interest justification for
revealing someone’s identity. I also claim that delegit-
imizing doxing may be permissible if it exposes evidence
of actual wrongdoing of public interest, and that the
information revealed must only be sufficient to establish
that such wrongdoing has occurred. I will argue that tar-
geting doxing is unjustifiable, as it deliberately increases
the risk of physical harm to the subject. In all cases,
however, the burden of proof is on whoever wishes to
disclose identity knowledge about the subject to justify
why her anonymity or obscurity should be removed.
The motivation behind doxing is significant for deciding
whether it is defensible or not. Doxing as a form of
intimidation is unacceptable as it attempts to silence the
subject and prevent her from participating in social, polit-
ical, and public activity. All three types of doxing may be
used for intimidation. Deanonymization intimidates those
who adopt a pseudonym or seek anonymity to express
unpopular or controversial views that they are otherwise
uncomfortable in expressing. Targeting doxing increases
the ease with which someone may be physically harassed
or harmed. Delegitimization vilifies the subject, inspiring
further harassment and reducing the likelihood that her
opinions will be given the public respect that they might
otherwise receive.
My arguments place considerable weight on the concept
of ‘public interest’. My interpretation of the concept is
based on two claims by Bok (1989): ‘‘[t]he public has a
legitimate interest […] in all information about matters that
might affect its welfare’’ (1989:258) and that information
reported to the public that only satisfies their curiosity
rather than affects their welfare must take into account the
privacy of those affected. These two claims reflect the
public/private distinction common to liberal political phi-
losophy. Deanonymizing and delegitimizing doxing are
acceptable only if they concern matters that affect the
welfare of the public. If we accept that individuals should
have control over who has access to identity knowledge
about herself, the burden of proof should be on whoever
attempts to reveal such information to justify why reveal-
ing it is in the public interest. If they are to be justified,
deanonymizing and delegitimizing doxing cannot be
indiscriminate: it must reveal only the identity knowledge
that is relevant to establish wrongdoing by a specific
individual. Such doxing can be considered analogous to
whistle blowing that reveals wrongdoing by or within
organizations.
206 D. M. Douglas
123
Particular instances of doxing could be justified if there
are allegations of legal wrongdoing, or if there is a legiti-
mate public interest reason for establishing someone’s
identity. This would seem to rule out most (if not all) cases
of targeting doxing, as these cases are intended to intimi-
date and promote further harassment of the subject. The
legitimacy of doxing depends on the motivations behind
publically releasing some of the subject’s identity knowl-
edge and the foreseeable risks of harm to the subject from
doing so. An instance of deanonymizing doxing, therefore,
might be justified on a consequentialist basis if the benefits
to the public of exposing wrongdoing or deception out-
weigh the foreseeable harms to the subject due to her loss
of obscurity.
An author using a pen name, for instance, does not seem
to be a compelling target for deanonymization on public
interest grounds if the pen name is not used to deceive
readers and is merely a way for a writer to adopt different
personas for different styles and genres of writing.
Revealing that Charles Dodgson was Lewis Carroll does
not seem to be particularly compelling from a public
interest standpoint as there is nothing inherent deceptive in
the claims made by the two personas. The rationales of
play and promoting experimentation are frequently the
motivations for adopting these personas (rationales 12 and
13 from Marx’s list), rather than any attempt to deceive.
Pen names for authors and stage names for performing
artists are often little more than designations of public
personas, and offer little in the way of anonymity or
obscurity. Revealing that the musician Bono was born Paul
Hewson does little (if anything) to affect the meaning of his
music or his political and social activism. While
deanonymization does not seem particularly troubling in
these cases, there also seems to be little reason for doing so
other than satisfying curiosity.
So-called ‘cross-penning’, where an author adopts a pen
name of a different gender, is slightly more problematic as
it may be intended to mislead the reader. However, here the
pseudonym is often adopted to lend the work credibility
and allow it to be judged on its own merits rather than
unfairly influenced by gender bias. This is the rationale of
wishing to keep attention to the work itself rather than to its
creator (rationale 3 from Marx’s list). George Sand, the pen
name of Armandine Dudevant, is just one example (Lev-
more 1996). Given the disproportionate chances of women
receiving misogynistic hate speech for their writings on the
Internet, female authors sometimes adopt masculine names
as a means of avoiding becoming targets for online abuse
(including doxing) (Citron 2014). Cross-penning in these
cases is both an attempt to have their work judged fairly
and as a means of protection against harassment. However,
this does not extend to literary hoaxes where the author
falsely claims to have personal experiences or attributes
that lend unjustified credibility to her work. Autobiogra-
phies that feature elaborate false accounts of the author’s
circumstances and experiences are one example (Manning
2012). It is more plausible to argue in such cases that the
author is being deceptive in these cases, as they are not
motivated by a desire to focus attention on the work itself
but on how the falsely claimed characteristics of the author
lend credibility to the work.
Ghostwriting is an interesting case where the problem is
reversed: the actual author is not the attributed author.
Ghostwriters are often an ‘open secret’: it is assumed that
many public figures use ghostwriters to produce works
published in their name (Goldacre 2012). At best,
employing a ghostwriter allows for the attributed ‘author’
to better express her own ideas. At worst, the ‘author’ is
misrepresenting her abilities to the readers of ‘her’ work. If
ghostwriting is used to obscure the source or interests of
the actual author, then there is a public interest justification
for revealing this. For example, such justifications exist in
the case of medical research, where the information pub-
lished may be used to decide on medical treatment and to
direct future research (Ngai et al. 2005). The names of
seemingly independent researchers are sometimes attached
(with their permission) to pharmaceutical studies to
obscure the fact that were primarily designed and con-
ducted by pharmaceutical company researchers (Goldacre
2012). Revealing the use of ghostwriters to gain unwar-
ranted credibility for published works would be delegit-
imizing doxing with a public interest justification.
I now return to the two specific instances of
deanonymizing doxing described earlier: Satoshi Naka-
moto and Violentacrez. Is there a public interest justifica-
tion for deanonymizing Satoshi Nakamoto? It depends on
whether identifying Nakamoto is merely satisfying public
curiosity or establishing information that benefits the
public. There is certainly historical interest in establishing
the identity of the creator (or creators) of such an influential
technology. The anonymity of Bitcoin’s creator may also
raise suspicions about the intent behind creating it. How-
ever, given that both the theory behind Bitcoin and the
source code of the software implementing it are open to
public review and revision, it seems unlikely that there is
anything malicious within the design and implementation
of Bitcoin itself. The pseudonym is unlikely to have been
adopted to deceive others for Nakamoto’s benefit, and the
adopting the pseudonym offers Nakamoto protection
against unwanted interference and outside interest. Dis-
covering Satoshi Nakamoto’s identity would certainly be
interesting given Bitcoin’s influence and technical merit,
but there seems little public benefit (in the sense that it
would better inform the public in matters that affect it) in
revealing this information beyond satisfying this curiosity.
There does not appear to be a strong reason for removing
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the actual creator (or creators) of Bitcoin from self-im-
posed obscurity.
The case of Satoshi Nakamoto raises another important
point: does doxing in any form have to be accurate to be
harmful? I suggest that the credibility that releasing doc-
umentary evidence has is important for what makes doxing
particularly harmful, as it cannot be simply dismissed as
gossip or hearsay. Through no fault of his own, Dorian
Satoshi Nakamoto lost his obscurity after the allegations
that he was ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ were published. Inaccurate
or out-of-date personal information released as targeting
doxing could lead to unconnected individuals being har-
assed. Inaccurate or false doxing may not be as harmful to
the subject as accurate doxing, but it is still an attempt to
remove the subject’s anonymity or obscurity, and may
harm others who are wrongly identified as the subject
individual.
Is there a public interest in revealing the identity of
Violentacrez? Again, it is not straightforward that dis-
closing Violentacrez’s identity is in the public’s interest or
just something to satisfy the public’s curiosity. Unlike
Dorian Satoshi Nakamoto, Michael Brutsch acknowledged
that he was ‘Violentacrez’, and so his own actions under
that pseudonym led to his loss of obscurity. Violentacrez’s
actions were certainly (and deliberately) offensive to many
people, and the deanonymizing doxing forced him to stop.
Distinguishing between offensive speech and hate speech
offers a potential justification for this deanonymization.
Hate speech expresses claims that those with certain
characteristics (such as gender, race, or sexual preference)
are inferior in moral worth and little more than objects to
be used and exploited (Citron 2014). There is a public
interest in resisting such expression as it promotes harmful
divisions within society. Hate speech damages the per-
ception (and if left unaddressed, eventually the treatment)
of such people as moral agents equal to ourselves that we
have duties toward and with rights of their own (Waldron
2010). In the case of Violentacrez, many of the sub-reddits
that he created or moderated (such as ‘chokeabitch’ and
‘rapebait’) may be classified as ‘hate speech’ or objectifi-
cation. Deanonymization might be justified as a means of
limiting or stopping such hate speech by increasing the
speaker’s accountability.
A strong objection to this conclusion is that such
deanonymizing doxing risks of turning into the private
enforcement of public laws and moral standards, and has
the potential to further develop into vigilantism. Trottier
suggests the term ‘digital vigilantism’ for ‘‘a process where
citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity,
and respond through coordinated retaliation on digital
media’’ (2016:2). The identity knowledge revealed through
deanonymization makes it considerably easier to perform
targeting and delegitimizing doxing of the subject. While it
may appear to be ‘just desserts’ for a hate speaker to be
harassed, it should be rejected on the same grounds that the
intimidation promoted by targeting doxing is rejected.
Another objection is the concern that the costs and
harms of deanonymization to the individual concerned
outweigh the social benefits of making her accountability
for offensive behavior. Consider a situation where someone
uses a pseudonym to express controversial views that could
be portrayed as harmful to the public interest, such as
seditious comments or questioning strongly held religious
or social beliefs in ways that are not hate speech. Those
who object to such views might justify deanonymizing this
person on public interest grounds. This would return
deanonymizing doxing to being a tool for intimidating
those with unpopular views rather than as a means of
making those who cause harm through their anonymous or
pseudonymous actions accountable.
The Violentacrez case is a good illustration of this
second objection. The deanonymization was used to shame
Michael Brutsch and harm him materially, as he lost his job
through being deanonymized.12 Had he not been protected
by his pseudonym, it is likely he would have acted dif-
ferently. If we accept that at least some of Violentacrez’s
postings were hate speech and objectification, that there is
a public interest in controlling expressions of such speech.
However, given the material harms that he would fore-
seeably suffer as a result of anonymization, it is worth
considering what alternatives were available for stopping
the hate speech from taking place. In this instance, there is
a clear alternative: the site operators should have removed
his deliberately offensive postings and sub-forums from
Reddit. This alternative may be challenged by claims that it
limits freedom of expression, but it may be defended if
freedom of expression is not considered to be an absolute
right that cannot be limited by other rights (Waldron 2010).
Another response is to emphasize that accountability
should go both ways in deanonymizing someone: whoever
performs the deanonymization should not be anonymous or
pseudonymous herself. In both the ‘Nakamoto’ and Vio-
lentacrez examples is that the persons revealing identity
knowledge about the subjects were not themselves
anonymous. The journalists involved did not use anon-
ymity as a means of avoiding responsibility for their
actions. Journalists also have editors and their own pro-
fessional judgment about what is in the public interest to
reveal in news stories. Revealing information under a legal
name makes it easier to be held accountable for doing so.
12 It should be noted that there is a difference between this shaming
and that covered by delegitimizing doxing. Unlike delegitimizing
doxing, the material used to delegitimize Brutsch was already
revealed: his offensive contributions to various sections of Reddit.
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This accountability does not in itself legitimize doxing, as
there are other protections that those revealing information
may enjoy that are unavailable to the subject. Private
individuals are unlikely to be able to afford costly legal
disputes with media enterprises that reveal their personal
information. Nonetheless, this offers a potential solution
for difficult cases where it is not clear whether there is a
public interest in revealing someone’s identity or not.
Finally, I will briefly consider the possibility of targeting
and delegitimizing doxing that is claimed to be the public
interest. Exposing corruption is often used to justify doxing
or Internet campaigns that feature doxing. An example is
the so-called ‘Gamergate’ controversy, which its defenders
claim is an attempt to expose corruption in computer games
journalism.13 Quinn’s relationship with the journalist
Nathan Grayson had no effect on how her game was
reviewed, as Grayson’s published work only mentioned her
game in passing and did not actually review it (Mantilla
2015). The ‘exposing corruption’ justification is further
weakened by the forms of doxing used on Quinn (partic-
ularly targeting doxing) and Gjoni’s apparent motivation
behind releasing delegitimizing information, which appears
to be a desire to punish his former girlfriend (Mantilla
2015). The public interest should not justify any instance of
doxing that objectifies the subject, as objectification por-
trays the target as unworthy of personhood, without legit-
imate interests of her own that should also be recognized
(Nussbaum 2010).
Conclusion
Anonymity and obscurity protect us from the unwanted
intrusion of others into our lives, and allow us to express
our ideas and ourselves in circumstances where we other-
wise could not. They are also useful tools for deception and
hiding wrongdoing. Doxing hinders all of these purposes
by deliberately removing some of the subject’s obscurity.
In the three forms I have described here, doxing can be a
tool for establishing accountability for wrongdoing, a
means of intimidation and incitement to cause harm, and a
way of silencing minority or dissenting views. I have
argued that only revealing personal information that is in
the public interest to disclose and only to the extent nec-
essary to establish wrongdoing is justified. There is much
more to say about doxing and the role it plays in public
discourse, and I hope this brief account of how acts of
doxing can be classified will be useful to those who
examine these issues in the future.
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